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TEXTUALISM IN THE “ZONE OF TWILIGHT” 
UNDERSTANDING TEXTUALISM’S EFFECTS ON 
YOUNGSTOWN CASES
russell balikian1
 inTroducTion
Under the three-part framework first set forth by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, the validity of  executive action in the realm of  national security and foreign affairs de-
pends substantially on statutory language and, thus, statutory interpretation. This article examines 
textualism’s effects on cases in this area of  law and on the area of  law itself. I begin by providing an 
overview of Youngstown and textualism. Then, focusing on Supreme Court cases that have interacted 
directly with the Youngstown framework, I examine how three categories of  legislative history have 
been employed in Youngstown cases and conclude that one of  these categories has a strong tendency 
to benefit Congress. Next, I distinguish my argument that textualism operates to eliminate a con-
gressional advantage in Youngstown cases from the unsupported and mistaken notion that textualism 
has an inherent proexecutive tilt. I conclude by discussing textualism’s effects on national security 
and foreign affairs law more broadly.
i. The Youngstown framework and The rise of TexTualism
In April 1952, President Truman issued an executive order directing his Secretary of  Commerce 
to seize most of  the nation’s steel mills. Employees of  the mills had threatened a nationwide strike, 
and the President believed the seizures necessary to ensure that the U.S. military would have the 
steady supply of  steel it needed to maintain the war effort in Korea. But Congress had not autho-
rized these seizures, and the steel mills challenged them on the ground that the President had no 
constitutional power to effectuate them absent a statute giving him the authority to do so. President 
Truman disagreed, asserting that the sum of  his powers under the Constitution enabled him to meet 
the threat posed by the labor dispute regardless of  whether Congress had explicitly authorized the 
seizures. The lawsuit, styled Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, quickly made its way before the 
Supreme Court of  the United States. In one of  the most significant judicial decisions ever to address 
the separation of  powers within the federal government, the Court held the seizures unlawful and 
1 Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. Yale Law School, J.D. 2012. Thanks to Samina Bharmal and the 
editorial staff  of  the National Security Law Brief  for their excellent editorial work, to Daniel Suhr and Tommy Traxler 
for providing helpful feedback during the drafting process, and to my wife Amanda for her endless support and 
encouragement.
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affirmed an order enjoining them.2
But the opinion of  the Court in Youngstown was cursory and, from a precedential standpoint, not 
exceedingly helpful for deciding future disputes implicating the President’s national security and for-
eign affairs powers. Perhaps this is to be expected: when it comes to allocating these powers between 
the political branches, the Constitution itself  is fairly opaque. On the one hand, the Constitution 
vests “[a]ll legislative powers” in Congress,3 including the power to “declare War,” “regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations,” and “raise and support Armies.”4 On the other hand, the Constitution 
provides that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of  the United States of  America”5 
who not only shall “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”6 but who also shall be “Com-
mander in Chief ”7 of  the armed forces and who possesses important foreign affairs powers, includ-
ing the power to make treaties (with the advice and consent of  the Senate)8 and the power to receive 
ambassadors.9 Indeed, the aggregate of  the President’s powers has led the Court to refer to the 
President as the “sole organ of  the federal government in the field of  international relations.”10
In an effort to provide a straightforward approach to the nebulous and tension-fraught area of  
national security and foreign affairs law, Justice Jackson authored a concurring opinion in Youngstown 
setting forth a three-part framework for determining the constitutional legitimacy of  executive ac-
tion. It was summarized as follows by Chief  Justice Roberts in 2008:
 
                                                                                                                              11
2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3 U.S. consT. art. I, § 1.
4 Id. art. I, § 8.
5 Id. art. II, § 1.
6 Id. art. II, § 3.
7 Id. art. II, § 2.
8 Id.
9 Id. art. II, § 3.
10 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting 6 Annals of cong. 613 (1800)).
11 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–25 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 
637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). My use of  the terms “Category I,” 
“Category II,” and “Category III” in this article refers to the categories identified in the quoted language above.
Simple but insightful, this framework has now been adopted by the Court12 and has only in-
creased in importance since the time it was penned.13 New threats to the United States’ security and 
interests have led modern Presidents to become increasingly bold in exercising national security 
and foreign affairs authority,14 and as Congress has occasionally sought to curb that trend through 
legislation,15 the result has been an increase in significant “Youngstown cases”16 reaching the Court.17
Meanwhile, as Youngstown was reshaping the way in which courts conceptualized the validity of  
executive action in the realm of  national security and foreign affairs, an intellectually robust brand 
12 See, e.g., id. at 524 (“Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating 
executive action in this area.”).
13 See Michel Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 consT. commenT. 215, 215 (2002) (“In the world after 
September 11, 2001, there can no longer be any doubt: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is one of  the most significant 
Supreme Court decisions of  all time.”).
14 With respect to national security decisions, conflicts initiated and sustained by the President without express 
congressional authorization are too numerous to list in detail here but have been summarized elsewhere, including 
richard f. grimmeTT, cong. reasearch serv., RL33532, war powers resoluTion: presidenTial compliance 
(2012). The Korean War (1950–1953) was the first large-scale operation of  that nature. curTis a. bradley & Jack l. 
goldsmiTh, foreign relaTions law: cases and maTerials 234 (3d ed. 2009). Recent drone strikes continue to raise 
questions about the scope of  congressional authorization to be found in the Authorization for Use of  Military Force 
(“AUMF”) passed in 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 114 Stat. 224 (2001).  See Congress Looks To Limit Drone Strikes, cbsnews, 
Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57567793/congress-looks-to-limit-drone-strikes/. As for 
the realm of  foreign affairs and international relations, several modern examples of  executive action in this area are 
discussed later in this article.
15 See, e.g., Congress Looks To Limit Drone Strikes, supra note 14. One major way in which Congress sought to curb the 
increase in unilateral foreign affairs and national security action taken by the President was passing the War Powers 
Resolution over the President’s veto in 1973. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, 559–60 (1973). However, the result 
has been a tension-filled legal atmosphere in which both Congress and the President assert constitutional justification 
for their respective positions in principle even as they rely in fact upon the terms of  the War Powers Resolution. Thus, 
recent Presidents of  both major political parties have sought to justify exercises of  executive power by arguing, for 
example, that commitments of  U.S. troops abroad were not made into “hostilities” within the meaning of  the War 
Powers Resolution. See, e.g., grimmeTT, supra note 14 (describing recent presidential compliance with the War Powers 
Resolution); Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation, n.y. Times (June 
15, 2011) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all (describing 
President Obama’s argument that the War Powers Resolution was inapplicable to operations in Libya because the 
situation there did not amount to “hostilities” within the meaning of  the War Powers Resolution). All the while, 
however, these Presidents have been asserting that the Commander-in-Chief  power is sufficient to justify their decisions. 
See GrimmeTT, supra note 14, at 2 (“[S]ince the War Powers Resolution’s enactment over President Nixon’s veto in 1973, 
every President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the President’s 
authority as Commander in Chief.”). Indeed, even when the President provides reports to Congress as the War Powers 
Resolution provides, such reports are made “consistent with,” not “pursuant to,” the War Powers Resolution. E.g., id. at 1 
(describing President Obama’s reports to Congress on the situation in Libya and on counterterrorism actions by the U.S. 
military).
16 The term “Youngstown cases” is used throughout this article to refer to cases requiring that Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework be applied—i.e., cases implicating the lawfulness of  executive action in the realm of  national 
security and foreign affairs.
17 Since 2000, the Supreme Court has decided five cases in which the Justices have interacted directly and substantially 
with the Youngstown framework. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied au-
thorization of  Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes 
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” 
Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of  either a congressional 
grant or denial of  authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of  twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” In 
this circumstance, Presidential authority can derive support from “con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.” Finally, “[w]hen the Pres-
ident takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of  
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain his 
actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”
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of  textualism began reshaping the way in which judges conceptualized statutory interpretation.18 The 
defining characteristics of  this “new textualism” are by now well-known: ascertaining the meaning 
of  the enacted text of  the statute at issue, jettisoning the pursuit of  congressional intent via legisla-
tive history, and utilizing canons of  construction to assist in the interpretational effort.19 But when 
textualism was first gaining acceptance in the courts, it represented a significant departure from what 
had been the prevailing norm. With legislative history more readily available than in previous genera-
tions, judges in the mid-twentieth century often relied heavily upon it in their efforts to ascertain and 
give effect to Congress’s apparent purpose or intent in passing a given statute. As textualism gained 
traction in the 1980s, however, citations to legislative history by the Court waned considerably, 
reaching their lowest post-1950 levels in 2004.20 While the debate over methods of  statutory inter-
pretation still continues,21 it is now safe to say that textualism has fundamentally altered the modern 
landscape of  statutory interpretation.22 Indeed, one commentator has written that “textualists have 
been so successful discrediting strong purposivism, and distinguishing their new brand of  ‘modern 
textualism’ from the older, more extreme ‘plain meaning’ school, that they no longer can identify, let 
alone conquer, any remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”23
This seismic shift in statutory-interpretation methodology usually manifests itself  on a case-by-
18 In this article, “textualism” is used to refer only to the theory of  statutory interpretation. The principles of  
textualism can be applied in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, 
in a maTTer of inTerpreTaTion: federal courTs and The law 37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (quoting McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)) (describing how textualism can be used when interpreting the 
Constitution); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–23 (2008) (examining the treaty’s text to determine whether or not it is self-
executing).
19 For a discussion of  textualism’s substance and theory, see generally anTonin scalia & bryan a. garner, reading 
law: The inTerpreTaTion of legal TexTs (2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
349 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 ucla l. rev. 621 (1990); John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 colum. l. rev. 70 (2006); and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 u. cin. l. 
rev. 849 (1989). For a more thorough discussion of  textualism’s history, see generally Eskridge, Jr., supra; and Jonathan 
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of  Textualism, 106 colum. l. rev. 1, 5–29 (2006).
20 An empirical study of  the Supreme Court’s statutory-interpretation cases reveals that, beginning in the mid-1980s, 
the Court’s use of  legislative history dropped precipitously. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The 
Supreme Court and the Use of  Legislative History, 51 wm. & mary l. rev. 1653, 1715 (2010) (“[F]rom the 1950s through the 
early 1970s, the Court became increasingly enamored of  legislative history. . . . [L]egislative history usage hit its overall 
peak of  nearly 70% twice—once in 1973 and again in 1984. By the mid-1990s, however, it had dropped sharply. . . . By 
the 2004 term, legislative history usage had reached its nadir, with only 11.1% of  the Justices’ statutory interpretation 
opinions making reference to legislative history.”). Other empirical studies and anecdotal evidence confirm this trend. See 
Molot, supra note 19, at 32 & nn.135–137.
21 See, e.g., Annie Sweeney, Scalia Wages War of  Words with Federal Appeals Judge in Chicago, chi. Trib., Sept. 19, 2012, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-19/news/ct-met-posner-scalia-scuffle-20120919_1_textual-originalism-
scalia-interpretation-of-legal-texts (describing Justice Scalia’s public debate with Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner, 
which covered, among other things, Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
22 See Molot, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that neither textualism’s adherents nor its nonadherents have recognized “just 
how thoroughly modern textualism has succeeded in dominating contemporary statutory-interpretation”); see generally 
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of  Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 
119 yale l.J. 1750 (2010) (explaining textualism’s role in prompting and shaping statutory interpretation debates taking 
place within the states).
23 Molot, supra note 19, at 2.
case basis as textualist judges interpret statutes differently than their nontextualist colleagues. And 
since the linchpin of  Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework24 is whether and how Congress has 
already legislated in the area at issue, these case-specific effects are certain to be evident in Youngstown 
cases. But textualism’s effects on national security and foreign affairs law extend beyond influencing 
the outcomes of  individual cases. Youngstown cases are unique in that regardless of  the litigants’ iden-
tities, the real parties in interest are always the two branches of  government responsible for passing 
the very legislation that determines how national security and foreign affairs powers will be allocated 
between them—namely, Congress and the President. This means that the real parties in interest in 
Youngstown cases possess both the ability to influence the application of  the Youngstown framework 
and a strong incentive to use that ability. But while Congress and the President both have important 
roles to play in enacting statutes, only Congress can directly shape the content of  these statutes’ 
unenacted legislative histories.25 By exploring how Congress exercises that power, this article explains 
textualism’s impact on Youngstown cases and its effects on national security and foreign affairs law 
more broadly.
ii. TexTualism’s effecTs on Youngstown cases
One key feature of  all theories of  statutory interpretation is that they define the realm of  stat-
utory-interpretation “evidence” that judges may permissibly consider when interpreting stat-utes. 
Thus, nontextualist theories embrace legislative history as an important source of  evidence relevant 
to the statutory-interpretation enterprise, whereas textualism does not. This distinction between tex-
tualist and nontextualist theories may have important implications for national security and foreign 
affairs law.26 If  legislative history in Youngstown cases tends to favor allocating national security and 
foreign affairs power to Congress over the President, then by precluding recourse to that evidence 
textualism would operate to level the legal playing field for the President.27 Put another way, if  non-
24 The term “Youngstown framework” is used in this article to refer to the three-part framework set forth in Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, not to any other aspect of  the opinion.
25 Although presidential signing statements could be considered a type of  “legislative history,” most non-textualists 
focus on ascertaining and giving effect to congressional intent. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of  Educ., 
550 U.S. 81, 105–07 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing “the importance of  remaining faithful to Congress’ 
intent”); see also Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An 
Executive Aggrandizement of  Power, 24 harv. J. on legis. 363 (1987) (arguing that presidential signing statements should 
not be used in interpreting statutes, even if  they purport to be discussing Congress’s intent); Note, Context Sensitive 
Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 harv. l. rev. 597, 599–600 (2006) (explaining that courts rarely rely on 
presidential signing statements when interpreting statutes and arguing that they should not be considered part of  the 
legislative history).
26 Of  course, excluding legislative history from the statutory-interpretation calculus is not the only defining 
characteristic of  textualism; theoretically one can refuse to consider legislative history and still be a thoroughgoing 
nontextualist.  But since nontextualist theories often reference legislative history in an effort to ascertain legislative intent 
or purpose, and since textualism generally eschews reference to legislative history, examining how legislative history tends 
to be employed in Youngstown cases is a convenient and fair way to assess whether and how textualism would impact legal 
analysis in these cases.
27 It bears briefly noting that a nontextualist might resist this characterization and argue that if  a certain category 
of  legislative history tends to favor one branch over the other, then the disfavored branch is improperly benefitting from 
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349 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 ucla l. rev. 621 (1990); John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 colum. l. rev. 70 (2006); and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 u. cin. l. 
rev. 849 (1989). For a more thorough discussion of  textualism’s history, see generally Eskridge, Jr., supra; and Jonathan 
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of  Textualism, 106 colum. l. rev. 1, 5–29 (2006).
20 An empirical study of  the Supreme Court’s statutory-interpretation cases reveals that, beginning in the mid-1980s, 
the Court’s use of  legislative history dropped precipitously. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The 
Supreme Court and the Use of  Legislative History, 51 wm. & mary l. rev. 1653, 1715 (2010) (“[F]rom the 1950s through the 
early 1970s, the Court became increasingly enamored of  legislative history. . . . [L]egislative history usage hit its overall 
peak of  nearly 70% twice—once in 1973 and again in 1984. By the mid-1990s, however, it had dropped sharply. . . . By 
the 2004 term, legislative history usage had reached its nadir, with only 11.1% of  the Justices’ statutory interpretation 
opinions making reference to legislative history.”). Other empirical studies and anecdotal evidence confirm this trend. See 
Molot, supra note 19, at 32 & nn.135–137.
21 See, e.g., Annie Sweeney, Scalia Wages War of  Words with Federal Appeals Judge in Chicago, chi. Trib., Sept. 19, 2012, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-19/news/ct-met-posner-scalia-scuffle-20120919_1_textual-originalism-
scalia-interpretation-of-legal-texts (describing Justice Scalia’s public debate with Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner, 
which covered, among other things, Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
22 See Molot, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that neither textualism’s adherents nor its nonadherents have recognized “just 
how thoroughly modern textualism has succeeded in dominating contemporary statutory-interpretation”); see generally 
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of  Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 
119 yale l.J. 1750 (2010) (explaining textualism’s role in prompting and shaping statutory interpretation debates taking 
place within the states).
23 Molot, supra note 19, at 2.
case basis as textualist judges interpret statutes differently than their nontextualist colleagues. And 
since the linchpin of  Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework24 is whether and how Congress has 
already legislated in the area at issue, these case-specific effects are certain to be evident in Youngstown 
cases. But textualism’s effects on national security and foreign affairs law extend beyond influencing 
the outcomes of  individual cases. Youngstown cases are unique in that regardless of  the litigants’ iden-
tities, the real parties in interest are always the two branches of  government responsible for passing 
the very legislation that determines how national security and foreign affairs powers will be allocated 
between them—namely, Congress and the President. This means that the real parties in interest in 
Youngstown cases possess both the ability to influence the application of  the Youngstown framework 
and a strong incentive to use that ability. But while Congress and the President both have important 
roles to play in enacting statutes, only Congress can directly shape the content of  these statutes’ 
unenacted legislative histories.25 By exploring how Congress exercises that power, this article explains 
textualism’s impact on Youngstown cases and its effects on national security and foreign affairs law 
more broadly.
ii. TexTualism’s effecTs on Youngstown cases
One key feature of  all theories of  statutory interpretation is that they define the realm of  stat-
utory-interpretation “evidence” that judges may permissibly consider when interpreting stat-utes. 
Thus, nontextualist theories embrace legislative history as an important source of  evidence relevant 
to the statutory-interpretation enterprise, whereas textualism does not. This distinction between tex-
tualist and nontextualist theories may have important implications for national security and foreign 
affairs law.26 If  legislative history in Youngstown cases tends to favor allocating national security and 
foreign affairs power to Congress over the President, then by precluding recourse to that evidence 
textualism would operate to level the legal playing field for the President.27 Put another way, if  non-
24 The term “Youngstown framework” is used in this article to refer to the three-part framework set forth in Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, not to any other aspect of  the opinion.
25 Although presidential signing statements could be considered a type of  “legislative history,” most non-textualists 
focus on ascertaining and giving effect to congressional intent. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of  Educ., 
550 U.S. 81, 105–07 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing “the importance of  remaining faithful to Congress’ 
intent”); see also Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An 
Executive Aggrandizement of  Power, 24 harv. J. on legis. 363 (1987) (arguing that presidential signing statements should 
not be used in interpreting statutes, even if  they purport to be discussing Congress’s intent); Note, Context Sensitive 
Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 harv. l. rev. 597, 599–600 (2006) (explaining that courts rarely rely on 
presidential signing statements when interpreting statutes and arguing that they should not be considered part of  the 
legislative history).
26 Of  course, excluding legislative history from the statutory-interpretation calculus is not the only defining 
characteristic of  textualism; theoretically one can refuse to consider legislative history and still be a thoroughgoing 
nontextualist.  But since nontextualist theories often reference legislative history in an effort to ascertain legislative intent 
or purpose, and since textualism generally eschews reference to legislative history, examining how legislative history tends 
to be employed in Youngstown cases is a convenient and fair way to assess whether and how textualism would impact legal 
analysis in these cases.
27 It bears briefly noting that a nontextualist might resist this characterization and argue that if  a certain category 
of  legislative history tends to favor one branch over the other, then the disfavored branch is improperly benefitting from 
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textualist judges tend to find support for Congress when examining legislative history in Youngstown 
cases, then textualism’s exclusion of  legislative history from the statutory-interpretation calculus 
could indirectly serve to consistently disadvantage Congress in Youngstown cases when compared to a 
nontextualist baseline. 
This observation is worth exploring in detail, and to do so I divide legislative history into three 
broad categories: (1) the failure of  Congress to enact legislation, often in the face of  new or altered 
circumstances (“non-enactment legislative history”); (2) the drafting history of  a bill as it moves 
through each house of  Congress; and (3) statements contained in the congressional record and in 
committee reports (collectively referred to as “congressional debates and reports” for simplicity’s 
sake). The first two categories of  legislative history might be considered circumstantial evidence of  
a statute’s meaning. Like a fingerprint on a doorknob, these categories of  statutory-interpretation 
evidence require nontextualist judges to draw inferences from objective facts that did not spring into 
being for the purpose of  answering the question presented to the court.28 The third category is more 
analogous to direct testimonial evidence. Just as a witness may offer testimony that directly answers 
the question before the court, so legislators use debates and reports as an opportunity to address 
themselves to interpretational questions that courts may face.29
By examining the role that each category of  legislative history plays in the nontextualist opin-
ions issued by members of  the Court in Youngstown cases,30 the following discussion shows that the 
circumstantial evidence categories of  legislative history have no noticeable tendency to support 
one branch over the other, whereas the testimonial evidence of  congressional debates and reports 
strongly benefits Congress. For that reason, textualism can be expected to have the effect of  elimi-
nating the advantage that nontextualist theories have given Congress, thereby benefitting the Presi-
dent overall.
A. Excluding Non-Enactment Legislative History
Non-enactment legislative history is often cited in Youngstown cases to demonstrate congressio-
nal acquiescence to (or disapproval of) exercises of  executive power. By inferring a particular intent 
from Congress’s failure to enact legislation, nontextualist judges use this type of  legislative history 
a textualist judge’s refusal to consider that legislative history. But regardless of  how the phenomenon is characterized, 
the result is the same: in Youngstown cases, the branch of  government whose ability to exercise national security and 
foreign affairs powers is favored by nontextualist judges’ views of  the legislative history would have a more difficult time 
defending those interests in a textualist legal landscape than in a nontextualist one.
28 See black’s law dicTionary 636 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “circumstantial evidence” to mean “[e]vidence based on 
inference and not on personal knowledge or observation”).
29 See id. at 636–37 (defining “direct evidence” to mean “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or 
observation and that, if  true, proves a fact without inference or presumption”).
30 These cases are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Two case omitted from this list, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), do not rely on legislative history in the context of  their Youngstown analyses and therefore 
are not discussed here.
to either strengthen or weaken “gloss[es]” on executive power.31 The circumstantial nature of  non-
enactment legislative history suggests that its use in Youngstown cases should have no tendency to 
support the allocation of  national security or foreign affairs powers to one branch of  government 
over the other. When Congress declines to enact legislation that would limit the President’s ability 
to exercise a national security or foreign affairs power, non-textualists might say that Congress is 
acquiescing to the President’s previous exercises of  such power and thereby allowing—perhaps even 
encouraging—that power to become a gloss upon the President’s constitutionally explicit powers. In 
other situations, however, Congress may consider and decline to enact statutory language that would 
authorize the President’s exercise of  a national security or foreign affairs power, thereby buttressing 
Congress’s own authority in that area relative to the President’s. The cases bear out the prediction 
that non-enactment legislative history has no tendency to favor one branch of  government over the 
other.
The President has often benefitted from non-enactment legislative history. In Youngstown, for 
example, Chief  Justice Vinson relied upon non-enactment legislative history to justify the President’s 
power to seize industrial plants when the necessities of  war required it, and to support his view that 
the Taft-Hartley Act was not intended to be an exclusive procedure for dealing with labor disputes.32 
Non-enactment legislative history also supported the President in American Insurance Ass’n v. Gara-
mendi.33 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter found as a preliminary matter that Congress had not 
authorized California (or any other state) to pass its own statute designed to assist Holocaust sur-
vivors in securing recompense from German business and governmental entities.34 This meant that 
there was “no need to consider” the President’s power to enter into executive agreements that might 
conflict with such congressionally supported statutes35—the President was operating in Youngstown 
Category II. Having avoided a Category III inter-branch clash, Justice Souter upheld the President’s 
ability to enter into preemptive executive agreements, supporting his conclusion by noting that 
31 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32 See id. at 695–96, 706–07 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
33 539 U.S. at 429. The factual background of  this case gives helpful context to the legal issues involved. In an effort 
to ensure that Jewish Holocaust survivors were able to collect restitution for, among other things, insurance policies that 
had either been confiscated or dishonored under the Nazi regime, the Clinton Administration entered into an executive 
agreement with Germany in 2000 setting up a dispute resolution system. See Agreement Concerning the Foundation 
“Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” U.S.–Ger., July 17, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13104. Essentially, the German 
government and German companies agreed to set up a fund that would be used to satisfy their obligations to victims 
of  the Holocaust, and the United States agreed to use its best efforts to funnel litigation related to these Holocaust-era 
claims out of  American courts and into the dispute-resolution mechanism established in connection with the fund. 
However, California enacted its own legislation to assist Jewish individuals in securing recompense, including a law that 
required California insurance companies to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 
1945 by the company or by anyone related to the company. See Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief  Act of  1999, cal. ins. 
code §§ 13800–13807; Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 401–12; see also id. at 430–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34 Although one of  the relevant statutes stated that “‘[t]he business of  insurance’ shall be recognized as a subject of  
state regulation,” 539 U.S. at 427 (majority opinion) (quoting McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000)), and 
that such regulation would not be preempted by federal legislation that did not “specifically relate[] to the business of  
insurance,” id. at 428 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)), the purpose of  those provisions was to limit potential preemption by 
Congress’s commerce powers, not by “executive conduct in foreign affairs,” id. at 428.
35 Id. at 427 (citation omitted).
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that such regulation would not be preempted by federal legislation that did not “specifically relate[] to the business of  
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B. Excluding Drafting History
Occasionally, nontextualist judges compare differing versions of  the same bill and infer congres-
sional intent from the changes made. As with non-enactment legislative history, the circumstantial 
nature of  such changes makes them unlikely to operate to the net benefit of  either Congress or the 
President in Youngstown cases. To the extent that a reliable inference can be drawn from the drafting 
history of  a bill, the factors shaping that inference would be numerous and would include the bill’s 
original contents, the committee(s) to which it was initially assigned, the overall political composition 
of  each house of  Congress, the party affiliation of  the President, and the extrinsic circumstances 
surrounding the passage of  the bill. Nothing about the nature of  drafting and revising national 
security or foreign affairs statutes makes it likely that the exclusion of  their drafting histories would 
consistently benefit either Congress or the President in Youngstown cases.
This intuitive statement is demonstrated by two of  the Court’s Youngstown cases. In Dames & 
Moore, Justice Rehnquist’s nontextualist opinion cites an early, unenacted version of  the “Hostage 
Act” as evidence that the enacted statute,44 which accorded the President greater discretion in choos-
ing how to respond to hostage situations than the unenacted version,45 should be read as a broad 
authorization of  presidential action. The statute’s drafting history therefore supported an allocation 
of  foreign affairs power to the President. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, however, Justice Souter found that 
the Non-Detention Act’s drafting history supported allocating national security power to Congress 
because an unenacted version of  that statute only prohibited imprisonment unauthorized by Title 
18 (i.e., the Criminal Code)—and thus arguably applied only to criminal detention—whereas the 
enacted statute prohibited imprisonment “except pursuant to an Act of  Congress.”46 Justice Souter 
believed that the linguistic change showed that “Congress was aware that [the enacted version of  
the Non-Detention Act] would limit the Executive’s power to detain citizens in wartime to protect 
national security, and it is fair to say that the prohibition was thus intended to extend . . . to statuto-
rily unauthorized detention by the Executive for reasons of  security in wartime.”47 Since Hamdi was 
a U.S. citizen and since Justice Souter did not believe that Hamdi had been detained pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of  Military Force (“AUMF”) enacted in the aftermath of  the attacks of  Sep-
tember 11, 2011, he concluded that the President should lose in Youngstown Category III.48
These two Youngstown cases illustrate the commonsense notion that the changes made to national 
security and foreign affairs bills during the drafting process are too situational to consistently favor 
allocating power to either Congress or the President. The method of  statutory interpretation em-
44 See 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (providing that any time a U.S. citizen was unjustly deprived of  liberty by a foreign 
government, the President should, after an unsuccessful demand of  release, “use such means, not amounting to acts of  
war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release”).
45 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (noting that the original version of  the statute authorized the 
President to either “suspend trade with a foreign country” or “arrest citizens of  that country in the United States” in 
retaliation for unjustly depriving a U.S. citizen of  liberty).
46 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545–46 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 4 (1971)); see also H.R. 234, 92d Cong. (as introduced Jan. 22, 1971) 
(original bill); Act of  Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (enacted bill).
47 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 546-47.
48 Id. at 552.
Congress had considered and refused to enact legislation similar to California’s and therefore “ha[d] 
done nothing to express disapproval of  the President’s policy.”36 Finally, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court held that the President could unilaterally suspend private 
claims pending in U.S. courts against foreign entities as a tool of  diplomacy.37 This conclusion was 
based in part on the fact that “Congress ha[d] not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, 
indicating its displeasure with the [President’s action].”38 Although Justice Rehnquist conceptualized 
the Youngstown framework as a “spectrum” rather than a tripartite scheme,39 his opinion represented a 
Youngstown Category II win for the President.
But Youngstown itself  contains two clear examples of  the fact that non-enactment legislative his-
tory can be used to support allocating national security and foreign affairs power in Congress’s favor 
as well. First, Justice Frankfurter relied heavily upon non enactment legislative history to show that, 
in the context of  the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had twice considered and ultimately declined to 
enact a provision that would have maintained the President’s ability to seize industrial plants when 
the public health or safety required it.40 In Justice Frankfurter’s view, Congress’s failure to enact such 
a provision was strong evidence that the Taft-Hartley Act forbade the President from exercising that 
seizure power. Similarly, Justice Clark relied on non-enactment legislative history to conclude that 
Congress had rejected giving the President a unilateral seizure power,41 and instead “had prescribed 
methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency at hand.”42 Since neither Justice 
Frankfurter nor Justice Clark believed that President Truman had the constitutional power to disre-
gard these procedures when seizing plants or other facilities for the public health or safety, their use 
of  non-enactment legislative history led them to conclude that the President lost in Category III. 
These cases illustrate that non-enactment legislative history does not consistently benefit one 
branch of  government over the other when employed by nontextualists in Youngstown cases. Thus, by 
declining to give effect to any particular instance of  congressional failure to pass legislation,43 textu-
alism is not likely to impact national security and foreign affairs law beyond individual cases.
36 Id. at 429.
37 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
38 Id. at 687.
39 Id. at 669 (“[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of  three 
pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit 
congressional prohibition.”). Later opinions reverted to the tripartite framework. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 
524–25 (2008).
40 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 599–601 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). The President’s wartime seizure powers had terminated earlier. See id. at 599.
41 See id. at 663 & n.9 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing non-enactment legislative history); see also id. at 
664 & n.11 (“The legislative history of  the Act demonstrates Congress’ belief  that the 80-day period would afford it 
adequate opportunity to determine whether special legislation should be enacted to meet the emergency at hand.”).
42  Id. at 662.
43 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
“the nonenactment of  . . . proposed legislation” is not a reliable indication of  what Congress—i.e., “a majority of  both 
Houses of  Congress”—intended in passing a statute).
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national security, and it is fair to say that the prohibition was thus intended to extend . . . to statuto-
rily unauthorized detention by the Executive for reasons of  security in wartime.”47 Since Hamdi was 
a U.S. citizen and since Justice Souter did not believe that Hamdi had been detained pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of  Military Force (“AUMF”) enacted in the aftermath of  the attacks of  Sep-
tember 11, 2011, he concluded that the President should lose in Youngstown Category III.48
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allocating power to either Congress or the President. The method of  statutory interpretation em-
44 See 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (providing that any time a U.S. citizen was unjustly deprived of  liberty by a foreign 
government, the President should, after an unsuccessful demand of  release, “use such means, not amounting to acts of  
war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release”).
45 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (noting that the original version of  the statute authorized the 
President to either “suspend trade with a foreign country” or “arrest citizens of  that country in the United States” in 
retaliation for unjustly depriving a U.S. citizen of  liberty).
46 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545–46 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 4 (1971)); see also H.R. 234, 92d Cong. (as introduced Jan. 22, 1971) 
(original bill); Act of  Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (enacted bill).
47 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 546-47.
48 Id. at 552.
Congress had considered and refused to enact legislation similar to California’s and therefore “ha[d] 
done nothing to express disapproval of  the President’s policy.”36 Finally, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court held that the President could unilaterally suspend private 
claims pending in U.S. courts against foreign entities as a tool of  diplomacy.37 This conclusion was 
based in part on the fact that “Congress ha[d] not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, 
indicating its displeasure with the [President’s action].”38 Although Justice Rehnquist conceptualized 
the Youngstown framework as a “spectrum” rather than a tripartite scheme,39 his opinion represented a 
Youngstown Category II win for the President.
But Youngstown itself  contains two clear examples of  the fact that non-enactment legislative his-
tory can be used to support allocating national security and foreign affairs power in Congress’s favor 
as well. First, Justice Frankfurter relied heavily upon non enactment legislative history to show that, 
in the context of  the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had twice considered and ultimately declined to 
enact a provision that would have maintained the President’s ability to seize industrial plants when 
the public health or safety required it.40 In Justice Frankfurter’s view, Congress’s failure to enact such 
a provision was strong evidence that the Taft-Hartley Act forbade the President from exercising that 
seizure power. Similarly, Justice Clark relied on non-enactment legislative history to conclude that 
Congress had rejected giving the President a unilateral seizure power,41 and instead “had prescribed 
methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency at hand.”42 Since neither Justice 
Frankfurter nor Justice Clark believed that President Truman had the constitutional power to disre-
gard these procedures when seizing plants or other facilities for the public health or safety, their use 
of  non-enactment legislative history led them to conclude that the President lost in Category III. 
These cases illustrate that non-enactment legislative history does not consistently benefit one 
branch of  government over the other when employed by nontextualists in Youngstown cases. Thus, by 
declining to give effect to any particular instance of  congressional failure to pass legislation,43 textu-
alism is not likely to impact national security and foreign affairs law beyond individual cases.
36 Id. at 429.
37 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
38 Id. at 687.
39 Id. at 669 (“[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of  three 
pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit 
congressional prohibition.”). Later opinions reverted to the tripartite framework. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 
524–25 (2008).
40 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 599–601 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). The President’s wartime seizure powers had terminated earlier. See id. at 599.
41 See id. at 663 & n.9 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing non-enactment legislative history); see also id. at 
664 & n.11 (“The legislative history of  the Act demonstrates Congress’ belief  that the 80-day period would afford it 
adequate opportunity to determine whether special legislation should be enacted to meet the emergency at hand.”).
42  Id. at 662.
43 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
“the nonenactment of  . . . proposed legislation” is not a reliable indication of  what Congress—i.e., “a majority of  both 
Houses of  Congress”—intended in passing a statute).
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ployed by judges is therefore unlikely to make a difference beyond individual cases.
C. Excluding Congressional Debates and Reports
Whereas both non-enactment legislative history and drafting history constitute circumstantial 
evidence of  a statute’s meaning for nontextualists, congressional debates and reports are akin to 
trial testimony in that they purport to provide direct answers to the questions at issue. And just as 
litigants who take the stand in their own cases can phrase their testimony in such a way as to encour-
age favorable dispositions, so members of  Congress—to the virtual exclusion of  the President—can 
use congressional debates and reports to guide nontextualist judges toward a preferred interpreta-
tion of  a statute. These debates and reports may represent genuine discussions of  the proper scope 
of  executive power, or they may be contrived attempts to encourage the judiciary to limit ambigu-
ous grants of  executive power in favor of  a congressman’s party or the institution of  Congress as a 
whole. Regardless, one would expect that citations to congressional debates and reports by nontex-
tualist judges overwhelmingly favor allocating national security and foreign affairs power to Congress 
rather than the President. Once again, the cases bear this out.
Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter’s nontextualist concurring opinion in Youngstown. To 
show that Congress intended to maintain control over industrial plant seizures in the context of  the 
Taft-Hartley Act, he cited the Senate Labor Committee’s chairman, who said that the committee 
thought it better to address labor issues by passing ad hoc legislation than by granting emergency 
seizure powers to the President.49 Similarly, in the context of  the Defense Production Act of  1950, 
Justice Frankfurter found particularly relevant a statement by a member of  the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency announcing that Congress would only recess for “very limited periods of  time” 
while the country was at war and, therefore, would be “readily available to pass such legislation as 
might be needed to meet the difficulty” of  labor disputes that could hamper the war effort.50 To 
Justice Frankfurter, these statements assuring Congress’s availability to pass labor-related legislation 
made Congress’s views absolutely clear: the President was not authorized to unilaterally seize domes-
tic manufacturing plants.51
Similarly, Justice Souter in Hamdi cited a committee report stating that by strictly limiting the 
detention of  citizens to situations in which Congress had authorized detention, Congress could 
assure itself  that “no detention camps can be established without at least the acquiescence of the 
Congress.”52 He also cited a back-and-forth debate between a bill sponsor and another congressman 
49 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 600 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 606 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 12275 (1950) (statement of  Sen. Irving Ives)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
51 See id. at 609 (“It is one thing to draw an intention of  Congress from general language and to say that Congress 
would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress has not addressed itself  to a specific situation. It is quite 
impossible, however, when Congress did specifically address itself  to a problem, as Congress did to that of  seizure, 
to find secreted in the interstices of  legislation the very grant of  power which Congress consciously withheld. To 
find authority so explicitly withheld is . . . to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of  
authority between President and Congress.”).
52 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 546 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
h.r. rep. no. 92-116, at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
to similar effect.53 Relying heavily on these citations, Justice Souter concluded that “Congress was 
aware that [the relevant provision of  the Non-Detention Act] would limit the Executive’s power to 
detain citizens in wartime to protect national security.”54
Finally, in Dames & Moore, Justice Rehnquist cited the congressional record to show that the 
Hostage Act was not passed to authorize the President to respond to the type of  hostage situation 
at issue in the case.55 Relying on this determination, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the President’s 
actions did not fall into Youngstown Category I.
All of  the above citations to congressional debates and reports support allocations of  national 
security and foreign affairs power to Congress. Of  course, there are times at which members of  
Congress find it to be in the country’s best interest to allocate national security and foreign affairs 
power to the President. At such times, statements in congressional debates and reports would be 
likely to reflect that interest. However, it does not follow that these statements cancel out those that 
favor Congress and thereby render this category of  legislative history neutral between the branches. 
There are two reasons that consideration of  congressional debates and reports still benefits Con-
gress over the President.
All of  the above citations to congressional debates and reports support allocations of  national 
security and foreign affairs power to Congress. Of  course, there are times at which members of  
Congress find it to be in the country’s best interest to allocate national security and foreign affairs 
power to the President. At such times, statements in congressional debates and reports would be 
likely to reflect that interest. However, it does not follow that these statements cancel out those that 
favor Congress and thereby render this category of  legislative history neutral between the branches. 
There are two reasons that consideration of  congressional debates and reports still benefits Con-
gress over the President
First, from Congress’s perspective, congressional debates and reports constitute a uniquely valu-
able method of  influencing judicial statutory interpretation. The President has nothing like them 
since nontextualist judges do not find presidential signing statements to be imbued with nearly as 
much persuasive force as congressional debates and reports.56 And unlike the circumstantial catego-
ries of  legislative history, which are situational and rely on judicial inference drawing, members of  
Congress have virtually full control over the substantive conclusions that judges draw from congres-
sional debates and reports. Thus, the very fact that nontextualist judges are willing to consider this 
category of  legislative history serves to give Congress a significant leg up on the President—even 
when individual congressional statements actually support allocating national security or foreign af-
53 Id. (“In order to prohibit arbitrary executive action, [the bill] assures that no detention of  citizens can be undertaken 
by the Executive without the prior consent of  Congress.” (quoting 117 cong. rec. 31,551 (1971) (statement of  Rep. 
Railsback)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54  Id.
55 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 676 (1981) (citing a statement in the congressional record for the 
proposition that the Hostage Act was passed to respond to situations in which foreign countries “refus[ed] to recognize 
the citizenship of  naturalized Americans traveling abroad” and would seek to “repatriat[e] such citizens against their 
will,” and not to respond to situations like the November 1979 hostage crisis in Iran (quoting cong. globe, 40th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4331, 4354 (1868))).
56 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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There are two reasons that consideration of  congressional debates and reports still benefits Con-
gress over the President
First, from Congress’s perspective, congressional debates and reports constitute a uniquely valu-
able method of  influencing judicial statutory interpretation. The President has nothing like them 
since nontextualist judges do not find presidential signing statements to be imbued with nearly as 
much persuasive force as congressional debates and reports.56 And unlike the circumstantial catego-
ries of  legislative history, which are situational and rely on judicial inference drawing, members of  
Congress have virtually full control over the substantive conclusions that judges draw from congres-
sional debates and reports. Thus, the very fact that nontextualist judges are willing to consider this 
category of  legislative history serves to give Congress a significant leg up on the President—even 
when individual congressional statements actually support allocating national security or foreign af-
53 Id. (“In order to prohibit arbitrary executive action, [the bill] assures that no detention of  citizens can be undertaken 
by the Executive without the prior consent of  Congress.” (quoting 117 cong. rec. 31,551 (1971) (statement of  Rep. 
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54  Id.
55 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 676 (1981) (citing a statement in the congressional record for the 
proposition that the Hostage Act was passed to respond to situations in which foreign countries “refus[ed] to recognize 
the citizenship of  naturalized Americans traveling abroad” and would seek to “repatriat[e] such citizens against their 
will,” and not to respond to situations like the November 1979 hostage crisis in Iran (quoting cong. globe, 40th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4331, 4354 (1868))).
56 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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fairs powers to the President.
The second reason that Congress benefits when congressional debates and reports are factored 
into the Youngstown calculus is that nontextualist judges rely much more heavily upon congressional 
debates and reports when they support Congress than when they support the President. In the three 
Youngstown cases in which citations to congressional debates and reports support presidential power,57 
not a single Justice disagreed about the proper understanding or application of  the statutes at issue 
in the Youngstown analysis, and none of  the citations did much independent work in the opinions.58 
Indeed, Justice Scalia, joined by fellow textualist Justice Thomas, wrote separately in Crosby v. Nation-
al Foreign Relations Council to point out that each proposition for which the Court majority had cited 
legislative history was “perfectly obvious on the face of  the statute” at issue in the case.59 Although 
different explanations for the asymmetrical utility of  this category of  legislative history are possible, 
the best is that while congressional debates and reports may well reflect a widespread desire to curb 
the President’s power beyond what the enacted text would suggest, it would be much more unusual 
for the legislative history to reflect a widespread desire to give the President more power than is giv-
en in the enacted text. The reason is simple: where there is a threat of  a presidential veto—as there 
often is when majorities of  both houses of  Congress seek to pass legislation limiting the President’s 
ability to act in the realm of  national security and foreign affairs—members of  Congress are more 
apt to pass a vague statute and hope that the legislative history (which cannot be vetoed) communi-
cates their aims.60 This is one method of  attempting to circumvent what Professor Koh has called 
57 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Relations Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 n.9, 376–78 nn.11–13, 380 n.15, 382 n.17, 385 n.23 
(2000) (citations omitted); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 at 696 & nn.61–63, 697–98 & nn.69–
71 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677–78 ( citations omitted).
58 In both Crosby and Dames & Moore, the Court was unanimous on the Youngstown analysis. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375–
76; id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 671–72, 674. And while Chief  Justice 
Vinson cited congressional debates in his dissent in Youngstown, the statute being discussed in that legislative history was 
not specifically at issue in the case. Instead, Chief  Justice Vinson cited those statements to show that Congress had long 
acquiesced to exercises of  executive power such as President Truman’s seizure of  the mills. As Chief  Justice Vinson 
put it, the statements helped to show that “Congress . . . ha[s] consistently recognized and given [its] support to such 
executive action,” which “indicates that such a power of  seizure has been accepted throughout our history.” Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
59 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388–90 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Although the congressional debates and reports 
in Dames & Moore were not quite so superfluous, the opinion makes clear that they were not very influential in helping 
Justice Rehnquist arrive at his conclusion that the President’s actions were authorized. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680 
(“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of  claim settlement 
by executive agreement.”); id. at 686 (“In light of  all of  the foregoing—the inferences to be drawn from the character 
of  the legislation Congress has enacted in the area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history of  
acquiescence in executive claims settlement—we conclude that the President was authorized to suspend pending claims 
pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294.”).
60 It is widely acknowledged that legislators may rely on legislative history to achieve results that would be politically 
unattainable if  explicitly provided for in the text of  the statute at issue.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring in the judgment); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the 
Rule of  Law, 44 sTan. l. rev. 383, 397–98 (1992).  And it is clear that the President’s veto power plays an important 
role in establishing what is politically attainable for a given statute, particularly in the realm of  national security and 
foreign affairs.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of  Presidential “Signing Statements”, 
the “one-way ‘ratchet effect’” of  the Court’s jurisprudence in this area.61 Where, however, Congress 
desires to give the President broad authorization to act in the realm of  national security and foreign 
affairs,62 it need not hide that fact in the legislative history for fear of  a veto. In any event, if  citations 
to legislative history that favor the President are unnecessary in arriving at the proper interpretation 
of  a statute, then the method of  statutory interpretation applied in interpreting that statute is not 
likely to make much practical difference.
By causing judges to disregard congressional debates and reports that are likely to either favor 
allocating power to Congress or to superfluously favor allocating it to the President, textualism oper-
ates to eliminate a category of  evidence in Youngstown cases that is most often and most effectively 
used to benefit Congress. Textualism would therefore tend to level the legal playing field for the 
President and to disadvantage Congress across Youngstown cases when compared to a nontextualist 
baseline.
D. Summary
The above-cited cases demonstrate that by prohibiting substantive consideration of  the catego-
ries of  legislative history akin to circumstantial evidence, textualism equally affects Congress and 
the President. But by excluding testimonial-type legislative history from the statutory-interpretation 
calculus, textualism eliminates a category of  legislative history that has tended to benefit Congress. 
Thus, by renouncing the use of  legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation, textualism’s 
net effect on Youngstown cases when compared to nontextualist theories of  statutory interpretation is 
to favor the President’s interests.
iii. TexTualism’s effecTs, noT preferences
In recent years, some commentators have challenged textualism as being little more than a pre-
text for allowing the judge’s personal—and allegedly conservative63—proclivities to predetermine the 
40 admin. l. rev. 209, 216 (1988) (“The constitutional authority to veto legislation also provides the President with 
considerable legislative influence, which goes well beyond the obvious surface power to reject bills passed by a majority 
of  Congress. The threat of  a veto can have a major effect in shaping the legislative product.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of  the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 yale l.J. 1255, 1311 (1988) (arguing 
that the President’s veto power and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence combine to create “a one-way ‘ratchet effect’” 
that makes it difficult for Congress to limit the President’s national security and foreign affairs powers via statute); 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 yale l.J. 231, 356 n.95 (2001) 
(“[T]he President can shape the foreign affairs laws Congress passes by use of  the veto.”); John Yoo, Andrew Jackson 
and Presidential Power, 2 charlesTon l. rev. 521, 548 (2008) (“[T]he mere threat of  a veto provides [the President] with 
significant political advantage in influencing legislation.”).
61 See Koh, supra note 60, at 1311.
62 See, e.g., Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702).
63 See, e.g., Paul Killebrew, Note, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1899–1901 (2007) 
(noting that most adherents to textualism are conservative, due primarily to the fact that textualism embraces a minimal 
role for judges); Law & Zaring, supra note 20, at 1654 (stating that, as a statistical matter, “liberal Justices are generally 
more likely than conservative Justices to cite legislative history”).
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343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
59 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388–90 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Although the congressional debates and reports 
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of  the legislation Congress has enacted in the area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history of  
acquiescence in executive claims settlement—we conclude that the President was authorized to suspend pending claims 
pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294.”).
60 It is widely acknowledged that legislators may rely on legislative history to achieve results that would be politically 
unattainable if  explicitly provided for in the text of  the statute at issue.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring in the judgment); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the 
Rule of  Law, 44 sTan. l. rev. 383, 397–98 (1992).  And it is clear that the President’s veto power plays an important 
role in establishing what is politically attainable for a given statute, particularly in the realm of  national security and 
foreign affairs.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of  Presidential “Signing Statements”, 
the “one-way ‘ratchet effect’” of  the Court’s jurisprudence in this area.61 Where, however, Congress 
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affairs,62 it need not hide that fact in the legislative history for fear of  a veto. In any event, if  citations 
to legislative history that favor the President are unnecessary in arriving at the proper interpretation 
of  a statute, then the method of  statutory interpretation applied in interpreting that statute is not 
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By causing judges to disregard congressional debates and reports that are likely to either favor 
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ates to eliminate a category of  evidence in Youngstown cases that is most often and most effectively 
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President and to disadvantage Congress across Youngstown cases when compared to a nontextualist 
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D. Summary
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the President. But by excluding testimonial-type legislative history from the statutory-interpretation 
calculus, textualism eliminates a category of  legislative history that has tended to benefit Congress. 
Thus, by renouncing the use of  legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation, textualism’s 
net effect on Youngstown cases when compared to nontextualist theories of  statutory interpretation is 
to favor the President’s interests.
iii. TexTualism’s effecTs, noT preferences
In recent years, some commentators have challenged textualism as being little more than a pre-
text for allowing the judge’s personal—and allegedly conservative63—proclivities to predetermine the 
40 admin. l. rev. 209, 216 (1988) (“The constitutional authority to veto legislation also provides the President with 
considerable legislative influence, which goes well beyond the obvious surface power to reject bills passed by a majority 
of  Congress. The threat of  a veto can have a major effect in shaping the legislative product.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of  the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 yale l.J. 1255, 1311 (1988) (arguing 
that the President’s veto power and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence combine to create “a one-way ‘ratchet effect’” 
that makes it difficult for Congress to limit the President’s national security and foreign affairs powers via statute); 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 yale l.J. 231, 356 n.95 (2001) 
(“[T]he President can shape the foreign affairs laws Congress passes by use of  the veto.”); John Yoo, Andrew Jackson 
and Presidential Power, 2 charlesTon l. rev. 521, 548 (2008) (“[T]he mere threat of  a veto provides [the President] with 
significant political advantage in influencing legislation.”).
61 See Koh, supra note 60, at 1311.
62 See, e.g., Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702).
63 See, e.g., Paul Killebrew, Note, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1899–1901 (2007) 
(noting that most adherents to textualism are conservative, due primarily to the fact that textualism embraces a minimal 
role for judges); Law & Zaring, supra note 20, at 1654 (stating that, as a statistical matter, “liberal Justices are generally 
more likely than conservative Justices to cite legislative history”).
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outcome of  a case or even to shift an entire area of  the law.64 It is critical to distinguish my argument 
from those arguments and from similar ones charging textualism or textualist judges with an intrin-
sic ideological bias. This article focuses on understanding textualism’s effects on national security 
and foreign affairs law when compared to nontextualist methodologies. I argue that textualism tends 
to operate in the President’s favor across Youngstown cases when compared to nontextualist methods 
of  statutory interpretation. I do not argue that judges who use methods of  statutory interpretation 
consistent with textualism tend to vote in the President’s favor in Youngstown cases when compared to 
judges using nontextualist methods of  statutory interpretation. Indeed, the cases bear out the com-
monsense notion that there is nothing inherent in textualism that predetermines the political branch 
with which a judge will ultimately side in Youngstown cases.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 65 was a 2004 national security case addressing the practice of  detaining U.S. 
citizens as enemy combatants. There is no single majority opinion in Hamdi; rather, one majority of  
Justices held that the AUMF provided the executive branch with at least some authority to detain 
citizens who were enemy combatants,66 while another majority held that any such detainee had the 
right to a hearing which would afford him the opportunity to present evidence that he was not an 
enemy combatant at the time of  his capture. Since Yaser Esam Hamdi’s right to challenge his de-
tention was (successfully) asserted under the Constitution and did not involve the interpretation or 
application of  any statute,67 I focus here only on the question of  the President’s authority to detain 
him.
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion for a plurality of  the Court in which she heavily emphasized 
historical and judicial precedent with respect to executive power in the realm of  national security. 
Her text-based68 understanding of  the AUMF, combined with her understanding of the relevant 
precedent, led her to the conclusion that Congress had authorized the detention of  enemy combat-
ants who were also U.S. citizens,69 thereby satisfying a preexisting statute called the Non-Detention 
Act that precluded U.S. citizens from being “imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of  Congress.”70 This conclusion put the President in Youngstown Category 
64 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Constitutional Morphology: Text, Context, and Pretext in Constitutional Interpretation, 19 ariZ. 
sT. l.J. 587, 587–88 (1987) (arguing that textualism “tends to produce a highly conservative jurisprudence” based on a 
“simplistic and tendentious linguistic method” that is “inextricably linked to the restrictive objectives that the doctrine’s 
proponents advocate”); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of  Textualism, 40 Vill. l. rev. 93, 100–21 (1995) 
(accusing Justice Scalia of  engaging in “selective and tortured use of  rules” in certain cases to arrive at results more 
consistent with conservative ideals); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of  Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza 
v. Pyett, 14 lewis & clark l. rev. 825, 826 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court “has used the judicial method of  
interpretation known as textualism . . . to reinvent statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field of  
arbitration”).
65 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
66 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–19; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67 Cf. id. at 534 n.2 (“[W]e hold that Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above . . . .”).
68 For purposes of  this discussion, an opinion that interprets relevant statutory texts by focusing on their ordinary 
meaning in context and that avoids citing legislative history as part of  the interpretive endeavor may be considered 
textualist in nature.  Cf. supra note 26.
69 In Justice O’Connor’s view, detention is an incident of  war and thus part of  the “necessary and appropriate force” 
referred to in the AUMF. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–19.
70 Id. at 515 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I, and Justice O’Connor therefore upheld the President’s ability to detain Hamdi. Justice Thomas 
agreed with the plurality opinion that the AUMF authorized the President to detain citizens acting as 
enemy combatants,71 but dissented from the plurality’s decision to remand the case, arguing that the 
Constitution permitted the President to deny Hamdi’s habeas claim.72 To the relatively small extent 
that his opinion interacted with the AUMF, it was also textualist in nature.73 Finally, Justice Scalia dis-
agreed with both Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s opinions in spite of  the fact that Justice 
Scalia also approached the case from a textualist perspective. In his view, the AUMF did not consti-
tute clear enough congressional authorization to justify detention of  a citizen, especially in light of  
the specific language of  the Non-Detention Act.74 
In the subsequent case of  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court addressed the validity of  the military 
commissions set up by the President to hear petitions from Guantánamo detainees.75 A majority of  
the Court concluded that the commissions were unlawful.76 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion both utilized analysis consistent with textualist principles 
to arrive at diametrically differing results on the merits. Justice Kennedy—who had joined Justice 
O’Connor’s text-based opinion in Hamdi upholding the President’s detention authority—set forth 
his own text-based77 opinion in Hamdan interacting explicitly with the Youngstown framework and 
agreeing with the majority that the President’s actions fell into Youngstown’s third category because, 
in spite of  the President’s belief  to the contrary, the tribunals were not “uniform insofar as prac-
ticable,” as required by the Uniform Code of  Military Justice (UCMJ).78 Justice Thomas, joined in 
71 Indeed, the language of  his opinion indicates he likely would have upheld detention even if  Congress had explicitly 
prohibited the detention at issue and the President were operating in Category III. See id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree with 
the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the President to do so.”).
72 Id. at 579.
73 Id. at 587 (grounding his conclusion that Congress authorized the President to detain U.S. citizens serving as enemy 
combatants in the enacted language of  the AUMF).
74 Id. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view, Hamdi’s continued detention could be justified only if  Congress 
suspended the writ of  habeas corpus or if  criminal charges were brought against him. Id. at 554. Since no one contended 
that Congress had suspended the writ, and since criminal charges were not forth-coming, Justice Scalia would have 
reversed and had Hamdi released. Id.
75 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006); cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (suggesting that a military tribunal could meet the standards 
articulated by the Hamdi Court).
76 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, ruled against the President in Category III. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612–13; 
see also id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to 
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of  its own war 
powers, placed on his powers.”).
77 The opinion’s text-based nature is evidenced by a common textualist move: citation to a dictionary, in this case 
to determine the meaning of  the word “practicable” in the UCMJ. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 640–41 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Although Justice Kennedy concurred with Justice Stevens’s majority opinion (which was nontextualist 
on the whole), the portions of  both opinions that deal with the Youngstown framework are consistent with textualist 
principles.
78 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006); see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This is not a case, then, 
where the Executive can assert some unilateral authority to fill a void left by congressional inaction. It is a case where 
Congress, in the proper exercise of  its powers as an independent branch of  government, and as part of  a long tradition 
of  legislative involvement in matters of  military justice, has considered the subject of  military tribunals and set limits on 
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and foreign affairs law when compared to nontextualist methodologies. I argue that textualism tends 
to operate in the President’s favor across Youngstown cases when compared to nontextualist methods 
of  statutory interpretation. I do not argue that judges who use methods of  statutory interpretation 
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judges using nontextualist methods of  statutory interpretation. Indeed, the cases bear out the com-
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Justices held that the AUMF provided the executive branch with at least some authority to detain 
citizens who were enemy combatants,66 while another majority held that any such detainee had the 
right to a hearing which would afford him the opportunity to present evidence that he was not an 
enemy combatant at the time of  his capture. Since Yaser Esam Hamdi’s right to challenge his de-
tention was (successfully) asserted under the Constitution and did not involve the interpretation or 
application of  any statute,67 I focus here only on the question of  the President’s authority to detain 
him.
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion for a plurality of  the Court in which she heavily emphasized 
historical and judicial precedent with respect to executive power in the realm of  national security. 
Her text-based68 understanding of  the AUMF, combined with her understanding of the relevant 
precedent, led her to the conclusion that Congress had authorized the detention of  enemy combat-
ants who were also U.S. citizens,69 thereby satisfying a preexisting statute called the Non-Detention 
Act that precluded U.S. citizens from being “imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of  Congress.”70 This conclusion put the President in Youngstown Category 
64 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Constitutional Morphology: Text, Context, and Pretext in Constitutional Interpretation, 19 ariZ. 
sT. l.J. 587, 587–88 (1987) (arguing that textualism “tends to produce a highly conservative jurisprudence” based on a 
“simplistic and tendentious linguistic method” that is “inextricably linked to the restrictive objectives that the doctrine’s 
proponents advocate”); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of  Textualism, 40 Vill. l. rev. 93, 100–21 (1995) 
(accusing Justice Scalia of  engaging in “selective and tortured use of  rules” in certain cases to arrive at results more 
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v. Pyett, 14 lewis & clark l. rev. 825, 826 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court “has used the judicial method of  
interpretation known as textualism . . . to reinvent statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field of  
arbitration”).
65 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
66 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–19; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67 Cf. id. at 534 n.2 (“[W]e hold that Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above . . . .”).
68 For purposes of  this discussion, an opinion that interprets relevant statutory texts by focusing on their ordinary 
meaning in context and that avoids citing legislative history as part of  the interpretive endeavor may be considered 
textualist in nature.  Cf. supra note 26.
69 In Justice O’Connor’s view, detention is an incident of  war and thus part of  the “necessary and appropriate force” 
referred to in the AUMF. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–19.
70 Id. at 515 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I, and Justice O’Connor therefore upheld the President’s ability to detain Hamdi. Justice Thomas 
agreed with the plurality opinion that the AUMF authorized the President to detain citizens acting as 
enemy combatants,71 but dissented from the plurality’s decision to remand the case, arguing that the 
Constitution permitted the President to deny Hamdi’s habeas claim.72 To the relatively small extent 
that his opinion interacted with the AUMF, it was also textualist in nature.73 Finally, Justice Scalia dis-
agreed with both Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s opinions in spite of  the fact that Justice 
Scalia also approached the case from a textualist perspective. In his view, the AUMF did not consti-
tute clear enough congressional authorization to justify detention of  a citizen, especially in light of  
the specific language of  the Non-Detention Act.74 
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the Court concluded that the commissions were unlawful.76 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
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to arrive at diametrically differing results on the merits. Justice Kennedy—who had joined Justice 
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his own text-based77 opinion in Hamdan interacting explicitly with the Youngstown framework and 
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in spite of  the President’s belief  to the contrary, the tribunals were not “uniform insofar as prac-
ticable,” as required by the Uniform Code of  Military Justice (UCMJ).78 Justice Thomas, joined in 
71 Indeed, the language of  his opinion indicates he likely would have upheld detention even if  Congress had explicitly 
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(“Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree with 
the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the President to do so.”).
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suspended the writ of  habeas corpus or if  criminal charges were brought against him. Id. at 554. Since no one contended 
that Congress had suspended the writ, and since criminal charges were not forth-coming, Justice Scalia would have 
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75 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006); cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (suggesting that a military tribunal could meet the standards 
articulated by the Hamdi Court).
76 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, ruled against the President in Category III. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612–13; 
see also id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to 
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of  its own war 
powers, placed on his powers.”).
77 The opinion’s text-based nature is evidenced by a common textualist move: citation to a dictionary, in this case 
to determine the meaning of  the word “practicable” in the UCMJ. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 640–41 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Although Justice Kennedy concurred with Justice Stevens’s majority opinion (which was nontextualist 
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78 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006); see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This is not a case, then, 
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this case by Justice Scalia, disagreed with Justice Kennedy and authored a textualist dissent arguing 
that the UCMJ should be read in conjunction with the AUMF to give the President broad Category 
I power,79 and that in any event the President’s practicability determination was entitled to strong 
deference.80 
The fractured nature of  the text-based opinions in Hamdi and Hamdan belies the notion that 
textualism itself  dictates results favoring one branch of  government over the other in Youngstown 
cases. Moreover, the opinions offer no support for the idea that the Justices have used textualism 
as a pretext enabling them to arrive at such a result. Justice Scalia opposed the President’s position 
in 2004 but supported that same President in 2006, whereas Justice Kennedy subscribed to Justice 
O’Connor’s 2004 opinion favoring the President’s position but ruled for Hamdan in 2006 by ap-
plying principles consistent with textualism. And while Justice Thomas deferred to the President in 
both Hamdi and Hamdan, he believed he was doing so with the clear support of  the statutory text 
and precedent in both opinions; he did not use textualism to foster ambiguity and thereby justify 
deference.81 Ultimately, each of  these opinions was at least consistent with textualist principles, 
and the Justices’ views of  independent factors—history and precedent in Hamdi; the scope of  the 
AUMF, the law of  war, and a treaty in Hamdan—largely explain their differing positions.
Textualism in the Youngstown context thus operates as any theory of  statutory interpretation 
should: it provides a neutral framework within which to understand the statutes relevant to the case 
at hand. A judge’s understanding of  the Constitution may well shape her views on the proper divi-
sion of  national security and foreign affairs powers between Congress and the President, but the 
Youngstown cases lend no support to the notion that textualism has merely served as a pretext for 
impermissible deference to one branch or the other in cases implicating these areas of  law.82 
iv. TexTualism’s effecTs on naTional securiTy and foreign affairs legislaTion 
In any area of  law, textualism’s focus on the enacted text of  statutes naturally incentivizes 
Congress to (1) increase the precision with which it drafts statutes, and (2) place greater emphasis 
on having potentially problematic issues resolved within the political (rather than judicial) process. 
These closely related effects are particularly likely to be displayed in national security and foreign af-
fairs law for several reasons. First, this area of  law is exceptionally important, meaning that members 
of  Congress are apt to ensure that statutes in this area are interpreted in conformity with their de-
the President’s authority.”).
79 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80 See id. at 682–83, 712–14.
81 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 584 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality’s understanding 
of  the AUMF); id. at 519 (plurality opinion) (“Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the 
narrow circumstances considered here.” ); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 680–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the AUMF 
contemplates “a heavy measure of  deference” to the President’s decisions to try enemy combatants before military 
tribunals); id. at 710–12 (arguing that the majority’s restrictive reading of  the UCMJ was unsustainable in light of  the 
Court’s interpretation of  the UCMJ’s predecessor).
82  Cf. Law & Zaring, supra note 20, at 1655 (“[L]egislative history usage is not correlated with more ideological 
decision making. Although the decision to use legislative history is influenced by ideological factors, the actual use of  
legislative history does not make it more likely that a Justice will arrive at his or her preferred outcome.”).
sires (whether those desires are in favor of  executive power or against it). More importantly, though, 
unfavorable decisions for Congress in Youngstown cases not only affect the specific facet of  national 
security or foreign affairs policy at issue in the case, but could also affect Congress’s continuing abil-
ity to exercise control over that policy area at all. While the damage done to congressional authority 
by such decisions is not likely to be permanent unless Congress wants it to be, the fact remains that 
the institutional stakes are higher for Congress in Youngstown cases than in cases implicating other 
areas of  law. It is therefore useful to examine more closely how textualism’s interaction with the 
Youngstown framework is likely to affect national security and foreign affairs law.
The first effect is that members of  Congress will likely pay closer attention to ensuring that 
statutes implicating the President’s non-exclusive national security and foreign affairs powers are as 
precisely worded as politically possible. This is not to say that all aspects of  those powers will be 
governed by detailed statutes, or that the statutes that are enacted will always be crystal clear. Even 
in the absence of  inter-branch friction, Congress often deems it best to remain silent on a given 
issue or to enact pliable standards governing executive action rather than attempt to “cover”83 the 
area. But to the extent that Congress intends to maintain control over an area of  national security or 
foreign affairs that the Constitution permits it to regulate, textualism’s currency in the courts should 
cause Congress to place a high priority on clearly defining its relationship with the President in the 
enacted text of  statutes implicating that policy area. And as limitations on executive power become 
more clearly articulated in the enacted text of  statutes, the boundaries of  Youngstown Category II (and 
thus Categories I and III) should become clearer to judges too. Congress need not risk losses in the 
twilight zone of  Category II if  it does not want to.
Increased efforts at ensuring statutory clarity tend toward a second systemic effect: Youngstown 
battles occurring in the Capitol rather than at the courthouse. Congress always legislates under the 
shadow of  the President’s veto pen and must be especially mindful of  the President’s views when 
submitting national security and foreign affairs legislation to his desk.84 But with the ascendancy 
of  textualism in the judiciary, a Congress jealously guarding its own national security and foreign 
affairs powers should be less willing than before to gamble on receiving a favorable interpretation 
of  ambiguous statutory language from the courts. Rather than rely on a private party to challenge 
executive action, a Congress operating in a textualist legal regime should be more willing to engage 
directly with the President before enacting legislation and even to push back when necessary. The 
resulting statute, refined by the fire of  intense inter-branch negotiation, is likely to reflect thought-
ful considerations of  each branch’s proper constitutional role in the particular aspect of  national 
security or foreign affairs policy at issue. Such a statute would command strong respect from both 
political branches of  government. Of  course, the political realities of  the situation may be such that 
a text riddled with the vague language of  compromise is the best that can be achieved. Even so, 
the increase in thoughtful political debate would be a welcome change to an area of  law that seems 
increasingly characterized by retrospective arguments about the meaning of  statutory texts and the 
83 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
84 That said, this is one area of  law in which the institutional dynamics between Congress and the President may make 
a legislative override of  a veto more likely to occur than in other areas. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 
87 Stat. 555, 559–60 (1973) (overriding President Nixon’s veto).
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impermissible deference to one branch or the other in cases implicating these areas of  law.82 
iv. TexTualism’s effecTs on naTional securiTy and foreign affairs legislaTion 
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These closely related effects are particularly likely to be displayed in national security and foreign af-
fairs law for several reasons. First, this area of  law is exceptionally important, meaning that members 
of  Congress are apt to ensure that statutes in this area are interpreted in conformity with their de-
the President’s authority.”).
79 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80 See id. at 682–83, 712–14.
81 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 584 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality’s understanding 
of  the AUMF); id. at 519 (plurality opinion) (“Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the 
narrow circumstances considered here.” ); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 680–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the AUMF 
contemplates “a heavy measure of  deference” to the President’s decisions to try enemy combatants before military 
tribunals); id. at 710–12 (arguing that the majority’s restrictive reading of  the UCMJ was unsustainable in light of  the 
Court’s interpretation of  the UCMJ’s predecessor).
82  Cf. Law & Zaring, supra note 20, at 1655 (“[L]egislative history usage is not correlated with more ideological 
decision making. Although the decision to use legislative history is influenced by ideological factors, the actual use of  
legislative history does not make it more likely that a Justice will arrive at his or her preferred outcome.”).
sires (whether those desires are in favor of  executive power or against it). More importantly, though, 
unfavorable decisions for Congress in Youngstown cases not only affect the specific facet of  national 
security or foreign affairs policy at issue in the case, but could also affect Congress’s continuing abil-
ity to exercise control over that policy area at all. While the damage done to congressional authority 
by such decisions is not likely to be permanent unless Congress wants it to be, the fact remains that 
the institutional stakes are higher for Congress in Youngstown cases than in cases implicating other 
areas of  law. It is therefore useful to examine more closely how textualism’s interaction with the 
Youngstown framework is likely to affect national security and foreign affairs law.
The first effect is that members of  Congress will likely pay closer attention to ensuring that 
statutes implicating the President’s non-exclusive national security and foreign affairs powers are as 
precisely worded as politically possible. This is not to say that all aspects of  those powers will be 
governed by detailed statutes, or that the statutes that are enacted will always be crystal clear. Even 
in the absence of  inter-branch friction, Congress often deems it best to remain silent on a given 
issue or to enact pliable standards governing executive action rather than attempt to “cover”83 the 
area. But to the extent that Congress intends to maintain control over an area of  national security or 
foreign affairs that the Constitution permits it to regulate, textualism’s currency in the courts should 
cause Congress to place a high priority on clearly defining its relationship with the President in the 
enacted text of  statutes implicating that policy area. And as limitations on executive power become 
more clearly articulated in the enacted text of  statutes, the boundaries of  Youngstown Category II (and 
thus Categories I and III) should become clearer to judges too. Congress need not risk losses in the 
twilight zone of  Category II if  it does not want to.
Increased efforts at ensuring statutory clarity tend toward a second systemic effect: Youngstown 
battles occurring in the Capitol rather than at the courthouse. Congress always legislates under the 
shadow of  the President’s veto pen and must be especially mindful of  the President’s views when 
submitting national security and foreign affairs legislation to his desk.84 But with the ascendancy 
of  textualism in the judiciary, a Congress jealously guarding its own national security and foreign 
affairs powers should be less willing than before to gamble on receiving a favorable interpretation 
of  ambiguous statutory language from the courts. Rather than rely on a private party to challenge 
executive action, a Congress operating in a textualist legal regime should be more willing to engage 
directly with the President before enacting legislation and even to push back when necessary. The 
resulting statute, refined by the fire of  intense inter-branch negotiation, is likely to reflect thought-
ful considerations of  each branch’s proper constitutional role in the particular aspect of  national 
security or foreign affairs policy at issue. Such a statute would command strong respect from both 
political branches of  government. Of  course, the political realities of  the situation may be such that 
a text riddled with the vague language of  compromise is the best that can be achieved. Even so, 
the increase in thoughtful political debate would be a welcome change to an area of  law that seems 
increasingly characterized by retrospective arguments about the meaning of  statutory texts and the 
83 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
84 That said, this is one area of  law in which the institutional dynamics between Congress and the President may make 
a legislative override of  a veto more likely to occur than in other areas. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 
87 Stat. 555, 559–60 (1973) (overriding President Nixon’s veto).
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propriety of  particular instances of  executive action.
To the extent that the political branches are able to work out potential problems ahead of  time 
and respect the agreements they reach, they will achieve another important result: reducing the need 
for judges to pass upon extremely difficult separation-of-powers issues that are closely entwined—
if  not quite inseparably entangled85—with delicate, complex, and important national security and 
foreign policy questions. The entanglement problem is one that Justice Jackson himself  recognized 
in Youngstown:
                  
The opinions of  judges, no less than executives and publicists, of-
ten suffer the infirmity of  confusing the issue of  a power’s valid-
ity with the cause it is invoked to promote, of  confounding the 
permanent executive office with its temporary occupant. The ten-
dency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies—
such as wages or stabilization—and lose sight of  enduring con-
sequences upon the balanced power structure of  our Republic.86
Of  course, textualism seeks to respond to this concern by foreclosing the possibility of  mining the 
legislative history for support of  a given viewpoint. But when the laws at issue are hopelessly am-
biguous or silent on the pivotal issue, the demand that judges separate politics from law inevitably 
becomes difficult because the line between policy and law is blurred. Thus, to the extent that textual-
ism succeeds in encouraging clear statute-writing from the outset, it assists judges in their endeavor 
to focus on the precise legal questions involved in the case and to “say what the law is.”87
But none of  these political-process-promoting outcomes is likely to occur unless the policy-
making branches understand that, should a dispute end up in court, the judiciary will hold them to 
their enacted word. As long as courts continue to give credence to ex post, legislative-history-based 
arguments about the intent behind a statute whose meaning may well have been unsettled or con-
troversial at the time of  its passage, there is little incentive for change. In short, a prerequisite to 
actualizing the effects described above is that textualism must become so wide-spread in the federal 
judiciary—at least in the context of  Youngstown cases—as to require Congress not only to be aware 
of  its existence, but also to account for its eventual and inevitable application. The twentieth-century 
practice of  referring to legislative history as an authoritative guide to statutory interpretation has 
undermined the perception that such planning is necessary in virtually any area of  law. Textualists 
have therefore decried its use.88 Fortunately for them—and for anyone who would prefer to see the 
Constitution’s equivocality on national security and foreign affairs powers be interpreted by elected 
officials engaging in public dialogue—the trend of  the past thirty years has been strongly in the 
85 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012) (holding that the political-question doctrine 
did not bar a suit implicating competing foreign affairs policies between a statute and a State Department manual).
86 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
87 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427–28 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
88 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 391 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(objecting to the majority’s “irrelevant,” “wasteful,” and “harmful” use of  legislative history).
textualists’ favor,89 so a more complete embrace of  textualism in Youngstown cases and its attendant 
benefits for this area of  law is perhaps more likely than ever.
conclusion
This Article has demonstrated that the recent rise of  textualism has significant practical implica-
tions for the complex and important field of  national security and foreign affairs law. Since congres-
sional debates and reports tend to favor Congress when employed in Youngstown cases (and since 
other categories of  legislative history are circumstantial in nature and exhibit no noticeable tendency 
to favor either political branch), textualism operates to the relative detriment of  Congress vis-à-vis 
nontextualist methodologies by excluding legislative history from judicial consideration. Far from be-
ing problematic, this result benefits representative democracy by incentivizing the political branches 
to avoid retrospective Youngstown skirmishes in the courtroom and to map out the contours of  their 
respective powers in a more fitting and constitutionally appropriate venue: the political arena.
89 See Law & Zaring, supra note 20, at 1715–16; John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 calif. l. rev. 1287, 
1307–09 (2010) (explaining that the debate on legislative history at the Court has arrived at a “middle ground”).
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